In this paper we present a modal extension of logic programming, which allows both multiple universal modal operators and embedded implications. We show that this extension is well suited for structuring knowledge and, more speci cally, for de ning module constructs within programs, for representing agents beliefs, and also for hypothetical reasoning. The language contains modalities ai] to represent agent beliefs, and a modality 2 which is a kind of common knowledge operator. It allows sequences of modalities to occur in front of clauses, goals and clause heads, and hypothetical implications to occur in goals and in clause bodies. A goal directed proof procedure for the language is presented, and several examples of its use for de ning modules are given. In particular, the language allows to capture di erent proposals for module de nition and composition presented in the literature.
Introduction
The problem of extending logic programming languages with modal operators, has recently raised a lot of interest. Several researchers have proposed extensions of logic programming with temporal logics and with (multi)modal logics (see 51, 22] for detailed overviews). In this paper we de ne a logic programming language which allows both multiple modalities and embedded implications, and we show that this extension is well suited for structuring knowledge and, in particular, for de ning module constructs within programs, for representing agents beliefs and also for hypothetical reasoning.
Our main motivation in de ning this language comes from the need of structuring facilities to enhance modularity, readability and reusability of logic programs. This problem has been addressed in the literature using many di erent approaches (like the meta-level approach 10, 12] , the algebraic approach 49, 37, 13] , and the approach based on use of higher-order logic 46, 16] ) and, in particular, it has been tackled by extending the language of Horn clauses with implications embedded in goals, as proposed in 42, 45, 32, 31 ] (see 15] for a survey of the di erent approaches).
Languages with embedded implications have been extensively studied 28, 25, 41, 39, 40] . These languages allow implications of the form D ! G to occur both in goals and in clause bodies, and this provides a way of introducing local de nitions of clauses: the clauses in D are intended to be local to the goal G, as they can be used only in a proof of G. 31] , a modal extension of Horn clause logic (based on S4 logic) is de ned to provide a unifying framework in which these di erent kinds of local de nitions of clauses can be de ned and integrated. Those extensions with embedded implications provide some di erent notions of a block, from which various kinds of modules can also be de ned, by introducing some syntactic sugar.
In this paper we aim at de ning a modal extension of Horn clause logic which provides structuring knowledge constructs as a basic feature. This extension is de ned on the line of the above mentioned language with blocks. However, in the present case, in addition to embedded implications, the language contains multiple modalities, which can be used to de ne modules. This can be done by associating a modality a i ] with each module and, in a more general setting, to provide reasoning capabilities in a multiple agent situation by associating a modality a i ] with each agent.
Module composition can be obtained by allowing modules to export clauses or derived facts. To achieve this purpose, a modal operator 2 is introduced, which makes it possible to distinguish among clauses local to a module, clauses that are fully exported from a module, and those whose consequences are exported. This language allows to model di erent kinds of modules presented in the literature (so that in each situation the kinds of module that suit better can be adopted). Furthermore, this language provides some well-known features of object-oriented programming, like the possibility of representing dependencies among modules in a hierarchy, and the notion of self to reason on this hierarchy.
When the modal operators introduced in this language are regarded as \belief" operators, the modality a i ] is used to represent the beliefs of agent a i , and the 2 operator can be regarded as a kind of \common knowledge" operator. Hence, the language is well suited for de ning module constructs, and for reasoning in a multiple agent situation. Moreover, hypothetical reasoning capabilities are provided by allowing hypothetical implications in goals and in clause bodies. In particular, since 2 is an S4 modality, the language subsumes N Prolog: by adopting the well-known translation of intuitionistic logic to modal logic S4, N Prolog clauses can be translated in our language.
The logic programming language presented in this paper is a modal logic re nement of hereditary Harrop formulas 44] , and it lies on the same line as other logic programming languages which are not based on classical rst-order logic, like, for instance, those based on intuitionistic logic 28, 25, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43] higher-order logic 44] and linear logic 35] .
The modal logic on which the language is based is a multi-agent version of K with a weaker version of the common knowledge operator presented in 34]. We de ne a Kripke semantics and a cut-free sequent calculus for this logic, and, then, we provide a sound and complete goal directed proof procedure for the clausal fragment of the language. This fragment has been taken as general as possible, while retaining the distinctive features of Horn clause logic, as, for instance, the goal directed proof procedure, and the possibility of restricting to Herbrand interpretations.
The logic we focus on is rather speci c and its choice is motivated by the above mentioned uses of our language. However, it is possible to see that an analogous proof procedure can be de ned for similar languages whose modal operators have di erent properties.
The paper could be regarded as being complementary to 31]. There, a modal language is proposed with the single modality 2, and the soundness and completeness of its proof procedure with respect to the Kripke semantics has been proved by making use of a canonical model construction. Here, instead, we investigate the relationship between the goal directed proof procedure of our multimodal language and the sequent calculus. In particular, we prove the soundness and completeness of the proof procedure with respect to the sequent calculus. Such a proof has some interest in itself, since it makes clear that our procedure looks for derivations which correspond to sequent proofs of a certain form. We compare such kind of proofs with uniform proofs as presented in 44] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the syntax of our logic programming language, called L, and we show some simple examples of programs in the language. In Section 3, we present the Kripke semantics for a rst order multimodal language L 2 k of which L is a clausal fragment. We compare our 2 operator to the notion of common knowledge presented in 34] . Moreover, we discuss the case of Herbrand interpretations. In Section 4, we give a goal directed proof procedure for L (operational semantics) and we show a more complex example. In Section 5,
we give examples to show how modules can be de ned in our language. Finally, in Section 6, we present a sound and complete sequent calculus for L 2 k and we prove soundness and completeness of the proof procedure with respect to the sequent calculus (the detailed proofs of these results are given in Appendix A and B).
The language
In this section we introduce our logic language L, which is a modal extension of Horn clause logic with hypothetical implications. Our language contains two kinds of modalities: a number (let us say k) of modalities a 1 ]; : : :; a k ], where each a i is a constant, which may represent for instance an agent or the name of a module, and a modal operator 2, which can be regarded as a sort of \common knowledge" operator. For the kind of applications we are going to consider, a modal formula a i ] may be read as \agent a i believes ", or \ belongs to module a i ". Let A represent atomic formulas of the form p(t 1 ; : : :; t s ), where p a predicate symbol and t 1 ; : : :; t s are terms of L, and let T be a distinguished proposition (true). The syntax of the language is the following: Note that embedded implications are allowed only when preceded by sequences of modalities. Consider, for instance, the clause (a b) a, in which the embedded implication a b is not preceded by any modality. The atom a is a logical consequence of the above clause in classical logic and in the underlying modal logic of our language (as we will see in section 3, this modal logic contains all classical tautologies). However, a cannot be proved from (a b) a using a goal directed proof procedure, unless it makes use of a \restart rule" (see 27] for a study of goal directed proof procedures with restart for classical logic). As we will see in the following, the modal operators a 1 ]; : : :; a k ] are modalities of type K, while the modal operator 2 is a modality of type S4. The two kinds of modalities interact, since, as mentioned above, the operator 2 is used to denote information which is common to all agents. This language is quite similar to the modal language introduced in 34] for dealing with the notions of knowledge and common knowledge, though, the modal operator 2 we have introduced does not exactly coincide with (and it is weaker than) the common knowledge operator in 34]. The goal a i ]G means that G has to be proved in the beliefs of agent a i (or within module a i ), while a i ]D means that the clause D is part of the beliefs of agent a i (or it belongs to the module a i ). Implication goals must be preceded by at least one modal operator.
To give an idea of how a program in this language is de ned, let us consider two simple examples. The former is a formulation of the (two) wise men puzzle, while the latter presents the Fibonacci example from 1].
Example 1 (The (two) wise men puzzle) The problem is as follows: \Once upon a time, a king wanted to nd the wisest out of his two wisest men. He told them that he would put a white or a black spot on their foreheads and that one of the two spots would certainly be white. The two wise men could see and hear each other but, of course, they could not see their faces re ected anywhere. The king, then, asked to each of them to nd out the color of his own spot. First a is asked and his answer is \I don't know". Then b is asked and says that he has a white spot on his forehead." The corresponding clauses are:
(
( a]ws(a) ?) In this example, ? is a proposition representing falsity (with no special property); bs(a) (ws(a)) represents the fact that a has a black (white) spot on his forehead. a] is a modal operator and a]F means that agent a knows F. All the clauses preceded by the modal operator 2, correspond to information which is common to all agents. In clause (3), a form of negation has been introduced as usual in a language with embedded implications, by making use of the proposition ?: \not F" is expressed by the implication F ?. So clause (3) can be read: if agent b knows that he does not have the black spot, then he knows that he has the white spot. (4) says that b knows that a does not know if he has the white spot on his forehead. This clause models the situation in which a is the rst which is asked, he does not know the answer and b knows that. In this example, the modal operators a], b] and 2 give a way to distinguish among information of the single agents and information common to all of them.
Example 2 (The Fibonacci numbers) In this example the modal operator next] represents the next instant of time. We want fib(X) to hold after n instants of time, if X is equal to Fibonacci of n. The formulation is the following:
Clause (1) says that at time 0, fib(0) holds; clause (2) says that at time 1, fib(1) holds; clause (3) says that, for any time n, if fib(Y ) holds at time n, and if fib(Z) holds at time n + 1, then fib(X), with X = Y + Z, holds at time n + 2. The sequence next] : : : next] of n 0 modalities is used to represent what holds after n instants of time.
From this program, the query next] next] next]fib(X) succeeds with X = 2, and indeed 2 is Fibonacci of 3.
Up to now we have just given an idea of how the language is de ned and which is the intended meaning of the modalities used in it. In the following sections we describe the modal logic on which the language is based and its operational semantics. Then, in Section 5, we discuss the use of this language to de ne module constructs.
3 The underlying logic: Kripke semantics
In this section we introduce the modal logic on which the language presented in the previous section is based, and we de ne a Kripke semantics for it.
First of all, let us de ne a rst order multimodal language L 2 k , containing the logical connectives :,^, , quanti ers 8 and 9, and the modal operators a 1 ]; : : :; a k ] and 2. We assume the language contains countably many variables, constants, function symbols and relation symbols. The logic programming language introduced in Section 2 is a clausal fragment of L 2 k .
In a rst order Kripke interpretation each world is associated with a domain of quanti cation. We do not assume that domains are constant. The only restriction we put on them is that the domain of a world w is contained in the domain of all worlds reachable from w, i.e. domains are increasing (or monotone).
In each interpretation we x a nonempty set D of possible objects. The domain of each world will be a subset of D. We assume that the language is extended with a constant c, for each element c of D which has no denotation in the language. We call the resulting language L 2 k;D . In this way, we can avoid to introduce variable assignments (i.e., functions assigning elements of the domain to the variables of the language) within Kripke interpretations.
Since the language has k + 1 modal operators, in each Kripke interpretation there are k + 1 di erent accessibility relations. In the following we call a formula which does not contain free variables a statement. Let us start by de ning a Kripke interpretation.
De nition 3 A Kripke interpretation M is an ordered tuple hW; R 1 ; : : :; R k ; ; D; J; V i, where:
W is a nonempty set of worlds; for i = 1; : : :; k, R i is a binary relation on W (the accessibility relation associated with a i ]); is a binary relation on W (the accessibility relation associated with 2) which is re exive and transitive, and satis es the condition ( (c) for each n-ary predicate symbol p and each world w 2 W, V (p; w) D n , i.e. V (p; w) is a set of n-tuples ha 1 ; : : :; a n i where each a i is an element in D.
Interpretation for terms in the domain is de ned as usual from the interpretation of constants and function symbols.
The meaning of a statement belonging to L 2 k;D is given by means of the satis ability relation j =; in particular, let M = hW; R 1 ; : : :; R k ; ; D; J ; V i, a Kripke interpretation, w a world in W and a formula, the meaning of M; w j = is that \ is true at w in the interpretation M". More formally we can de ne the following. A closed formula of the language L 2 k is satis able if there is a Kripke interpretation M = hW; R 1 ; : : :; R k ; ; D; J ; V i and some w 2 W with every constant of interpreted in J (w) such that M; w j = . We say that is a valid formula (j = ) if : is not satis able (i.e. if, for every Kripke interpretation M = hW; R 1 ; : : :; R k ; ; D; J ; V i, for every w 2 W with every constant of interpreted in J (w), M; w j = ).
Notice that, since the domain may change from a world to another, there is the problem of de ning the satis ability at a world w of a formula (t) containing a term t whose interpretation is not in J (w). With regard to this we follow 24, pages 341-342] and 36, pages 275-276] and we do not make any special restriction, like imposing (t) to be false in w, or to be unde ned. However, when we de ne the satis ability and validity of a formula we look at the truth value of the formula in an interpretation at a certain world only if the interpretation of each constant in the formula is in the domain of that world. Moreover, we require that functions map elements of a domain to elements of the same domain.
In general, when function symbols are present, each function symbol could be given a di erent interpretation at each di erent world. In the Kripke semantics above, however, function symbols are given the same interpretation in all possible worlds. As a consequence, closed terms have the same interpretation in all possible worlds (rigid designators). On the contrary, predicate symbols may have a di erent interpretation in each possible world. For a survey of the di erent systems for quanti ed modal logic see 29] .
As already remarked above, this Kripke semantics is quite similar to the possible world semantics for the (propositional) logics of knowledge and belief proposed in 34]. Indeed, our modal operator 2 can be taken as a weaker version of the common knowledge operator. In fact, in the Kripke semantics above, as a di erence with the one in 34], we force the accessibility relation associated to 2 to include the transitive and re exive closure of the union of R i and not to be equal to it. That means 2 cannot be regarded as a common knowledge operator, though it shares some of its properties. In particular, the formula A^2(A a 1 ]A^: : :^ a k ]A) 2A (the induction axiom for common knowledge) is not valid in the Kripke semantics of our language, while it is expected to be a valid formula when 2 is a common knowledge operator. In 30] a similar weaker version of common knowledge operator is suggested. To explain this notion of common knowledge, in 30] a ctitious knower has been assumed, sometimes called any fool. What any fool knows is what all other agents know, and all agents know that others know (and so on). In other words, instead of regarding common knowledge as an operator over beliefs of agents, it is regarded as a new agent which interacts with the others. A similar logic has been presented also in 21], where a modal resolution method is presented.
In 34, 30] axiom systems are de ned for the logics of knowledge and common knowledge in the propositional case. Similarly, an axiomatization of the above logic can be de ned. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the propositional case. The modal operators a i ] are all ruled by the axioms of K, and, in particular, A sound and complete axiom system for the logic above, in the propositional case, can be obtained by taking as axioms all those of the propositional calculus plus the axioms above, and taking as rules modus ponens and necessitation for each modal operator in the language (the proofs of soundness and completeness are quite similar to those in 34]).
Herbrand domains
In this section we show that for the programs in our language L we can, without loss of generality, restrict our concern to Kripke interpretations in which the Herbrand universe is the constant domain of quanti cation for each world. A similar property has been proved to hold for other modal and temporal languages, and, in particular, for TEMPLOG in 9], for an instance of MOLOG in 5], and for a general class of intensional logic programs in 52]. Moreover, in 17] a general Herbrand's property has been proved to hold for the modal system Q, and based on it, a rst order extension of propositional modal resolution is de ned.
In the following we denote by U P the Herbrand universe for a program P, i.e., the set of ground terms built up from the constants and function symbols that appear in P. Let us start by de ning a Kripke interpretation with Herbrand domain.
De nition 5 Let P be a program of L. A Kripke interpretation on the Herbrand universe of P is a Kripke interpretation M = hW; R 1 ; : : :; R n ; ; D H ; J H ; V H i such that: D H is the Herbrand Universe of P, U P ; J H is a constant function which maps all worlds in W to the Herbrand universe U P ; V H interprets terms as usual in Herbrand interpretations; i.e., V H (t) = t.
The relation j = between members of W and statements of L 2 k , the satis ability, and validity of a closed formula of the language is the same of Section 3. We can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Let P and G be a program and a closed goal of L. If, for a given Kripke interpretation M = hW; R 1 ; : : :; R n ; ; D; J ; V i and a world w 2 W, with every constant of P and G in J (w), M; w j = P^:G, then there is a Kripke interpretation M H = hW; R 1 ; : : :; R n ; ; D H ; J H ; V H i on the Herbrand universe of P such that M H ; w j = P^:G. Proof Since the proof is very close to the one of Proposition 1 in 31], we are going to report only a sketch of it here.
Given M, we de ne the Kripke interpretation M H as follows: D H = U P , J H (w) = U P for all w 2 W, and V H (p; w) = fht 1 ; : : :; t m i : hV (t 1 ); : : :; V (t m )i 2 V (p; w), and t 1 ; : : :; t m 2 U P g for all w 2 W. Note that we have assumed that the goal G contains the same symbols as P. Moreover, by de nition of M, every constant of P is interpreted in J (w) and J (w) is closed with respect to the interpretation of functions. Hence, all terms of U P have their V -interpretation in J (w), and thus in J (w 0 ) for all w 0 such that w w 0 (in fact, since domains are increasing, J (w) J (w 0 ) for all w 0 such that w w 0 ). Note also that, for each term t 2 U P , t is the denotation for the domain element V (t).
It can be proved that for all closed clauses D, closed goals G and closed clause heads H in the language of P, and for all worlds w 0 2 W such that w w 0 , the following three statements hold: The proof is by simultaneous induction on the structure of D, G and H. It can be obtained from the statements above by noticing that accessibility relation is re exive.
Now we are ready to show that we can restrict our consideration to Kripke interpretation on Herbrand domain. The next corollary follows easily from Proposition 6.
Corollary 7 For all programs P and goals G of L, j = P G i P G is true in all Kripke interpretations on the Herbrand universe U P (written j = H P G). Proof The only if part is obvious, and the if part can be proved by contradiction assuming that j = H P G but 6 j = P G and using Proposition 6.
A goal directed proof procedure
We now introduce a goal directed proof procedure for L. The notion of operational derivability for a closed goal G from a program P is de ned by induction on the structure of G. Since the language allows modal operators, and, in particular, free occurrences of modalities in front of a goal, in the operational semantics we introduce the notion of operational derivability of a closed goal G from a program P in a certain modal context.
A modal context is a sequence of modal operators and it records the ordering between modalities found in front of goals, during a computation. Note that the notion of modal context plays a role similar to that of pre xes of formulas in Fitting's tableaux system (see 24] ). Intuitively, pre xes are names for possible worlds and they allow to recognize syntactically whether the worlds being named are accessible or not.
Since our language allows hypothetical implications in addition to modalities, we de ne the modal context as a list of pairs In the following we de ne the operational derivability of a closed goal G from a modal context by induction on the structure of G. We introduce a proof rule for each kind of a goal.
De nition 9 (Goal Directed Proof Procedure) We de ne the proof procedure for a closed goal G from a modal context (L 0 ; D 0 ) j (L 1 ; D 1 ) j : : : j (L n ; D n ) by induction on the structure of G as follows: 
Given a program P and a closed goal G, we say that G is provable from P if (L 0 ; P)`G can be derived by applying the operational rules 1)-6).
In the de nition above, the rules for the distinguished proposition T, for conjunctions and for existentially quanti ed goals are the usual ones.
The rules 5) and 6) for embedded implications and modalized goals are quite similar. Embedded implications are always preceded by at least one modal operator. To prove a goal L(D G), where L is an arbitrary modal operator, the modal operator L is added to the current context together with the clauses in D, and G is proved in the resulting context. Similarly, a goal LG is proved by adding the modal operator L to the current context (with associated empty set of clauses) and proving G in the resulting context. ? allows the formula to go through a path L j1 j : : :jL jk , is that ? matches the path L j1 j : : :jL jk , according to the of modal operators (given by re exivity and transitivity properties of 2 and the interaction axiom 2A a i ]A). In other words, to verify that a clause in D j ] is applicable in the current context, it must be checked whether the modal operators in the clause (both in front of it and in front of its head) match the current context, from L j+1 to L n . In particular, the sequence of the modal operators ? b in front of the selected clause must match a pre x of the sequence L j+1 j : : :jL n , while the sequence of the modal operators ? h in front of the head of the selected clause must match the remaining part of the sequence. We say that a sequence ? of modal operators matches another sequence ? 0 Example 11 (The three wise men puzzle) We give a formulation of the three wise men puzzle, which is quite similar to the one of the two wise men puzzle in Section 2. In order to avoid introducing many variants of the same clause for the di erent agents, as a shorthand, we use the meta-variables X, Y and Z (where X; Y; Z 2 fa; b; cg and X 6 = Y , Y 6 = Z, and X 6 = Z).
1) 2(bs(X)^bs(Y ) ws(Z)) (2) 2(bs(X) Y ]bs(X)) (3) 2( X]((T bs(X)) ?) X]ws(X)) (4) 2( a]ws(a) ?) (5) c]( b]ws(b) ?)
We have modeled the situation in which a, b and c are asked in this ordering. a does not know if he has the white spot on his forehead; b doesn't know too. c knows their answers (clauses (4) and (5)) and, hence, he can conclude that he has the white spot. Note that we have modeled only one situation here. In order to generalize the problem we can remove clauses (4) and (5) Now the situation in which a; b and c are asked in this ordering is hypothesized and added to database.
In this section we have de ned a goal directed proof procedure for a speci c modal language with a collection of modalities of type K and a modality of type S4. In this procedure the properties of modalities are taken into account in the de nition of the matching relation. We can say that the procedure is modular with respect to the properties of modalities. In fact, by modifying only the matching relation we can obtain a proof procedure to cope with di erent kinds of modalities. Let us consider, for instance, the case when the modalities a i ] are ruled by the axioms of T, or K4, or S4, rather than K.
In De nition 10 the notion of matching is de ned in such a way that a modality a i ] may only match a i ] itself. This works for modalities of type K. If we change the properties of the a i ]'s, we have to modify that part of the matching relation concerning that modalities accordingly (while retaining the general structure of the procedure).
If the a i ]'s are ruled by the axioms of T (and their accessibility relation is re exive), the de nition of the matching relation has to be be changed as follows: f j ( a i ]) = a i ] or the empty sequence of modalities. If the a i ]'s are ruled by the axioms of K4 (and their accessibility relation is transitive), the de nition of the matching relation has to be be changed as follows: f j ( a i ]) = any nonempty sequence of modalities containing only occurrences of the modality a i ]. If the a i ]'s are ruled by the axioms of S4 (and their accessibility relation is re exive and transitive), the de nition of the matching relation has to be be changed as follows: f j ( a i ]) = any sequence of modalities containing only occurrences of the modality a i ] (including the empty sequence).
This idea of factoring out the properties of modalities in the matching relation has been further developed in 7] , by means of a notion of rewriting.
Note, however, that this approach does not allow us to deal with all kinds of modalities. In particular, our proof procedure cannot be used to cope with S5 modalities. Consider for instance the program P containing the single clause 2(2a b) a and the goal G = a. The formula P G is valid in S5, but there is no way in which we can change the matching relation in order to allow the goal G to be proved from the program P. In fact, the computation:
fails, since there is no clause for b in all of the modal context. In 50] a goal directed proof procedure for the implicational fragment of S5 has been de ned, by making use of an additional \restart rule" (which allows to restart the computation from a previous goal). Unlike other modal and temporal logic programming languages proposed in the literature (like for instance those in 1, 26, 5]), which allow existential modalities to occur in front of goals, in our language occurrences of existential modalities are not allowed. Due to the analogy between universal (existential) quanti ers and universal (existential) modalities, and to the fact that, in Horn clause logic universal quanti ers occur in front of clauses, while existential quanti ers occur in front goals, one could expect that our language might be easily extended by allowing existential modalities to occur in front of goal formulas. However, this is not true due to the interplay between existential modalities and embedded implications. We explain this by showing that our proof procedure cannot be easily modi ed to deal with the following example.
Consider the program P containing the single clause 2(a b) a (which is a legal clause of our language) and the goal G = 3a. The formula P G is valid in S4. From the operational point of view, we could think of dealing with the 3 modality by recording it in the modal context and by properly de ning a matching relation which also copes with existential modalities. However, whatever the de nition of the matching relation might be, a proof of G from P fails, since when using the clause in P to prove the goal, we have to prove the implication goal 2(a b), so we add a to the context, and we have to prove b. Thus the derivation fails, since (as in the above derivation for the S5 case) there is no clause for b.
De ning modules
Recently, a lot of e ort has been spent to introduce structuring constructs in logic programs while preserving their logical semantics. In the introduction we have mentioned some of the approaches proposed in the literature to cope with this problem (see 15] for an overview on the subject). In this section we show, through some examples, that the language we have introduced is well suited to de ne module constructs.
As we have mentioned above, the modalities a i ] of the language can be associated with modules and can be used to represent what is true in a module. In this case, each a i can be regarded as a module name. This provides a simple way to de ne a at collection of modules and to specify the proof of a goal in a module. In particular, if D is a set (conjunction) of clauses we may de ne the clauses in D as belonging to module a i through the module de nition 2 a i ]D; where the modality 2 in front of the module de nition is needed to make the de nition visible in any context (and, (1) and, hence, it can only be proved by making use of the clauses in the module list. In fact, the clauses in module sort cannot be used in the context (1), since all of them are pre xed by the sequence of modalities 2 sort], which does not match (1) .
In this simplistic view, modules are closed environments, and they cannot be composed. Thus, in this case, the query When a module is regarded as being open, it is allowed to export some information to the external environment. Consider for instance the query m 1 ] m 2 ] m 3 ]G, the goal G must be proved in the composition of modules m 1 , m 2 and m 3 . The ordering of modules in the query determines the direction in which information is exported: each module may export information to the modules following it in the sequence.
In our language, di erent forms of module composition can be obtained by making use of the modal operator 2 to control the information (either clauses or derived facts) that is exported by a module. In particular, we can make a distinction among: clauses that are local to the module in which they are de ned, G A (as in the example with closed modules above), clauses that are wholly exported by the module, 2(G A) (we call these clauses dynamic), and clauses that only export their head (consequences), G 2A (we call these clauses static). 1 . In our language, on the other hand, the de nitions of a predicate may be spread in di erent modules, and all of them can be used.
In the previous examples we have seen programs consisting of a at collection of modules. However, our language also allows nested modules to be de ned. By The module dictionary contains the de nition of getvalue, which returns the value associated with a name, and putvalue, which insert a new pair (name, value) in a dictionary if it is not already a member of it. The module dictionary also contains two nested modules, fast and small, which describe the predicates used in the de nition of getvalue and putvalue, in the case we wish to use a fast dictionary or a small dictionary, respectively. Then, we can retrieve a value associated to a name in a fast dictionary by asking the goal dictionary] fast]getvalue(N ame; V alue) Note that we can use module fast only when module dictionary is entered. In fact, using module fast (respectively small) is meaningful only when it is composed with module dictionary. Observe, moreover, that the usage of a dynamic clause for predicates getvalue and putvalue in module dictionary is due to the fact that they use predicates de ned in module fast (respectively, small).
The following is an example of the usefulness of dynamic clauses in nested modules. It is taken from 11] and describes inheritance in a hierarchy of modules. succeeds, since the clause de ning mode(run) is exported by the module animal and its body can be evaluated in the current context, including module bird which contains the information no of legs (2) . The goal would fail, if the modality 2 in front of the clause 2(mode(run) :? no of legs(X); X 2): in module animal were omitted. By using clauses preceded by the operator 2 (dynamic clauses) we can achieve a result somewhat similar to the use of self in object-oriented languages, by allowing methods of a class to use information coming from a more speci c class.
This feature is particularly needed to deal with statically con gured module system (see 11]), i.e. system where hierarchies among modules are speci ed when modules are de ned. We have modeled this feature by using nested modules. In fact, tweety is visible only if bird and animal are entered. Note, however, that the language also provides for dynamic con guration of modules, as it is shown by the last formulation of the sort example above.
To conclude this section we would like to point out at a possible use of embedded implication in the language to specify module interfaces 42]. Indeed, embedded implications can be used to hide those predicates of a module that we do not want to export. For instance, let m be a module containing a set of clause de nitions p 1 :? G 1 : : : p n :? G n together with a set of clauses D that must be visible only from within the module m. We can de ne m as follows: 
Correctness of the proof procedure
In order to prove the soundness and completeness of the goal directed proof procedure de ned in the previous section, we introduce a sequent calculus for the language L 2 k and we show that the operational derivations correspond to proofs (of some restricted form) in the sequent calculus. In the following we are concerned with a language containing only constant symbols and no function symbols for the sake of simplicity, so that we can refer to well established proof methods as those in 24, 53].
Sequent calculus
We present a cut-free sequent calculus for the language L 2 k which extends the cut-free sequent calculus for S4 presented in 53] (section 2.1) and adapted from 24]. In addition to the rules of the calculus for S4, a new rule is needed to deal with each modal operator a i ]. Since the proofs in the sequent calculus have to deal with free variables, we extend the language L 2 k with countably many new constants, called parameters (see 24] chapter 7, section 2). We call the extended languageL 2 k .
The calculus is shown in Figure 2 , where ? = f2 : 2 2 ?g and ? i = f : a i ] 2 ?g. For R8
and L9 there is the proviso that a is a parameter that does not occur in any formula of the lower sequent. In rule L8 and R9 c is any constant of the languageL 2 k .
In this sequent calculus there is no need for structural rules, since in a sequent ? ! the antecedent and the consequent are sets of statements rather than sequences of statements. Since T is a distinguished symbol which can be regarded as any propositional tautology, we can assume to have the additional initial sequent (axiom) ? ! T; to deal with this symbol.
A proof for the sequent ? ! is a nite tree constructed using the above rules, having the root labeled with ? ! and the leaves labeled with initial sequents, i.e. sequents of the form ?; A ! A; or of the form ? ! T; .
Note that a proof of a sequent ? ! , where ? and are sets of sentences of L 2 k , can make use of sequents containing sentences ofL 2 k . The rules L2 and R2 above are exactly the same as those of the calculus for S4 in 53]. The only di erence is due to the fact that in our language L 2 k the existential modal operator 3 is not present. Hence, the consequent of the premise ? ! A of rule R2, contains only the formula A and not the set of formulas = f3 : 3 2 g as in 53], since is empty. The inference rule L2 is needed since the modal operator 2 is of type S4, and, in the Kripke semantics, the accessibility relation associated with it is re exive. The inference rule R a i ] is needed to deal with the modal operator a i ], and it is quite similar in style to the rule R2. As a di erence with R2, the antecedent of its premise contains both the set ? and the set ? i , this corresponds to the fact that all the formulas of type 2 are visible from within the context of a modal operator a i ] (due to the interaction axiom). Moreover, since the modal operators a i ] are of type K, and, in the Kripke semantics, the accessibility relation associated with each of them is not re exive, there is no rule L a i ]. Both the proofs of soundness and completeness are based on standard techniques. Thus, we omit them. Soundness can be easily proved by showing that each of the axioms is valid, and each of the rules carries valid sequents to valid sequents, so that only valid sequents can be derived.
Completeness can be proved by de ning a suitable notion of consistency property as it is done in 23] for K, T and S4 (see also 24]). By making use of this notion, a model existence theorem can be proved for the logic above, stating that \if a set S of any statements ofL 2 k belongs to some consistency property, then S is satis able". The completeness of the sequent calculus follows from the fact that the collection of all nite sets fX 1 ; : : :; X n ; :Y 1 ; : : :; :Y k g of statements ofL 2 k , such that the sequent X 1 ; : : :; X n ! Y 1 ; : : :; Y k is not provable, is a consistency property.
Soundness and completeness of the proof procedure
We prove that the operational semantics de ned in Section 3 is sound and complete with respect to the sequent calculus above.
Completeness
The proof of completeness of the operational semantics with respect to the sequent calculus is based on some observations concerning the form of the proofs for a sequent P ! G, when P is a program and G is a goal of language L.
First of all, we can observe that the language L does not allow existentially quanti ed clauses nor universally quanti ed goals. Moreover negation never occurs in programs nor in goals. For this reason, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 17 Let be a proof of a sequent P ! G where P is a program and G a goal of L. Then contains no application of the rules L:, R:, L9 and R8.
Proof Our sequent calculus is cut-free. Hence, by the subformula property, derivations are formed entirely from the subformulas of their end sequent. In particular, no negation occurs in P and G, and therefore, no application of R: or L: is allowed in the proof of P ! G. Moreover, rules L9 and R8 are not applicable too, since in a proof of P ! G existentially quanti ed goals can never occur in the left hand side of a sequent and universally quanti ed clauses can never occur in the right hand side of a sequent.
A second observation is about L rule. We show that if we have to prove P ! G, then we can Corollary 19 Let be a proof of a sequent P ! G, where P is a program and G a goal of L.
Then each sequent occurrence in has a singleton set as its consequent.
The proofs of Lemma 18 (see Appendix B) and Corollary 19 rely on the fact that, in our language, each occurrence of an implication in a goal must be preceded by a modality. So this restriction is essential if we want the goal directed proof procedure to be complete. From this restriction, it also follows that each application of rule R in a proof of a sequent P ! G must be preceded by the application of rule R a i ] or R2. This allows to replace the rule R with the two rules R ai] and R 2 , as it is shown by the following Lemma. The modal context of a sequent in a proof of P ! G is essential to establish the correspondence between the steps in the operational derivation of G from P and sequents in the proof of P ! G.
We can think that a modal context represents the sequence of right rules R2 and R a i ] that have been applied in the corresponding sequent proof, up to that point. We now give an intuitive account of the correspondence between derivations in the operational semantics and proofs in the sequent calculus through the following example. (2) i.e., P ! G, is shown in Figure 3 , where 0 and 00 are, respectively, the two initial sequents 0 (7) 00 ( We can now prove completeness of operational semantics with respect to the sequent calculus.
Theorem 24 (Completeness of the operational semantics) Let P be a program and G 0 be a goal of L. G 0 is operationally derivable from P (i.e., (L 0 ; P)`G 0 ) if the sequent P ! G 0 is provable.
Proof It is trivial to observe that the properties (1) and (2) of the Lemma 23 hold for the sequent P ! G 0 whose modal context is (L 0 ; P). Hence, we can conclude (L 0 ; P)`G 0 .
Our proof of completeness is based on the idea that when proving a sequent P ! G we can restrict our attention, without loss of generality, to proofs of a certain kind. For instance, Corollary 19, tells that we can just consider proofs in which sequents have a single formula on their right hand side. It is worth noting that the kind of proofs found by our proof procedure are not \uniform", if we refer to the notion of uniform proof as presented in 44], which provides a natural interpretation of logical connectives as search operators in the space of the proofs. The problem is that modalities in a proof have the e ect of changing the modal context and they cannot be given an interpretation as search operators. In particular, before using R ai] and R 2 , some applications of left rules may be needed (see Figure 3 ), while this is not possible in a uniform proof. In fact, each occurrence of a sequent ! G in an uniform proof, where G is not an atomic formula, is obtained by applying the right rule for the main logical connective of G. On the other hand, we think that we could restrict our attention to uniform proofs, provided that we use an alternative notion of sequent claculus. In particular, we refer to a sequent calculus in which, as in Fitting's pre xed tableaux 24], the worlds are made explicit by means of pre xes. This could avoid the necessity of applying left rules before the right rules R 2 , R ai] , R2, and R a 1 ].
Soundness
Let us now prove the soundness of the operational semantics with respect to the sequent calculus de ned in Section 6.1. First, we observe that, by de nition, (L 0 ; P)`G can be derived by applying the rules of the operational semantics. That is, there is a sequence (W 0 ; G 0 ); (W 1 ; G 1 ); : : :; (W n ; G n ) such that W 0 = (L 0 ; P), G 0 = G, G n = T and, for all j = 1; : : :; n, (W j ; G j ) can be obtained from later pairs in the sequence by applying the proof rules 1)-6) of De nition 9.
The proof of the soundness of operational semantics w.r.t. sequent calculus is by a straightforward induction on length of derivation and can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 25 (Soundness of the operational semantics) Let P be a program and G a goal of L, if G is operationally derivable from P, then the sequent P ! G is provable.
Conclusions and related work
In this paper we have de ned a modal extension of Horn clause logic in which universal modalities are allowed to occur in front of clauses, goals and clause heads, while embedded implications are allowed to occur in goals and in clause bodies. A set of modal operators a i ] of type K have been used to de ne modules, by associating a modality with each module for labeling its clauses, and, in a more general setting, to provide reasoning capabilities in a multiple agents situation, by associating a modality with each agent to represent its beliefs. Moreover, a modal operator 2 of type S4 has been introduced, which can be regarded as a kind of \common knowledge operator". It has also been used to deal with module composition and to achieve some of the features of object-oriented languages. Embedded implications have been used to introduce local de nitions of clauses like blocks in imperative programming and for performing some forms of hypothetical reasoning.
The language extends the one proposed in 6] to deal with modules. In 6] embedded implications are not allowed and occurrences of modalities in front of clauses and clause heads are rather restricted. In particular, nested modules cannot be de ned. Furthermore, in this paper we have extended the language to contain function symbols. Hence, though the modal logic on which the two languages are based is the same, from the point of view of the programming languages the one proposed here is a wider and more exible fragment than the one in 6].
The language we have presented di ers from most of other proposals of extending logic programming with modal and temporal operators in that it allows hypothetical implications to occur in goals. In particular, this makes the language di erent from MOLOG 19] (later evolved in TIM 4]), a framework for modal logic programming in which the user may x the underlying modal logic. In MOLOG both existential and universal modalities may occur in front of clauses, in front of clause heads, and in front of goals. A resolution procedure, close to Prolog resolution, is de ned for modal Horn clauses in the logic S5 which contains only universal modal operators of the form knows(t), where t is an arbitrary term. TIM is a meta-level inference system which can support some well-known modal system and epistemic logics such as Q, T, S4, S5 and it provides a general methodology to implement non-classical logics. Though TIM modal Horn clauses may contain several implication symbols, such implications are not allowed to appear in the body of a clause or in a goal but only in the clause head. In 5] a modal SLD-resolution method is presented for a particular instance of MOLOG in which universal modalities are disallowed in the bodies of clauses while existential modalities are disallowed in clause heads. In the same work some di erent modal systems (Q, T and K4) are also considered.
Modal logic programming languages based on S5 have been also proposed in 2]. There a program is de ned as a set of modal de nite clauses whose literals are pre xed by any sequence of universal and existential modalities. An SLD-resolution procedure is de ned for these languages.
In our language, unlike other languages proposed in the literature (such as TEMPLOG 1], Temporal Prolog 26], the fragment of MOLOG in 5], and the language in 2]), occurrences of existential modal operators are not allowed. As we have observed at the end of Section 4, there are problems in dealing with existential modalities in our language with embedded implications.
TEMPLOG is a temporal logic programming language and it allows temporal operators like (next moment in time), 2 (from now on), and 3 (sometime in the future) to occur in Horn clauses. 3 is allowed in front of goals while 2 is not. In our language, while existential modalities are not admitted, 2 can occur in goals. Furthermore, no embedded implications are allowed in TEMPLOG. Despite these di erences, there are some similarities with TEMPLOG. In particular, in TEMPLOG a distinction is made between initial clauses (G A and G 2A), and permanent clauses (2(G A)), which is quite similar to our distinction between local, static and dynamic clauses (see Section 5) . Temporal Prolog 26] allows occurrences of temporal operators like F (sometime in the future), P (sometime in the past), 2 (always). This language is rather di erent from ours. In particular, it admits embedded implications, but in clause heads, rather than in clause bodies.
In this paper we have focussed on the relationship between the goal directed proof procedure and the sequent calculus of the underlying modal logic. We have proved its completeness and soundness with respect to the logical semantics by showing that our operational derivations correspond to sequent proofs of a certain form. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the proofs of soundness and completeness of the operational semantics with respect to the model theory could have been given directly, without using a sequent calculus. In particular, the completeness could be proven through a Henkin-style canonical model construction. Actually, a similar proof was given in 31] for a language which is a fragment of the language presented here. There, a canonical model construction is introduced, which builds a canonical Herbrand model for a given program. The worlds of such a canonical model (which is a Kripke structure) are sequences of sets of clauses (which are kinds of simpli ed \modal contexts") and correspond to the nested sequences of the implication goals during the computation. A very similar canonical model construction could be given for the language presented in this paper.
Another aspect of the declarative semantics which we have not discussed concerns the xpoint semantics. In 5] a xpoint semantics is provided for an instance of MOLOG. In particular, the declarative semantics associated to a program is developed in terms of a tree, de ned as the xpoint of a certain transformation T P . Such a tree represents the minimal Kripke model of the program. In 9] a xpoint characterization of the declarative semantics of TEMPLOG programs is also given. Both of these languages can be seen to belong to the class of intensional logic programs introduced in 52] by Orgun and Wadge. There, a language-independent theory is developed, which can be applied to a variety of intensional logic programming languages by investigating general properties of intensional operators (of which modal operators are a special case). In particular, they use a neighborhood semantics of Scott and Montague as an abstract formulation of the denotations of intensional operators and they show that intensional Horn programs (i.e. programs in which atomic formulas can be pre xed by any sequence of intensional operators) have a xpoint characterization of the declarative semantics under some condition. In particular, intensional operators that appear in clause heads have to be universal, monotonic and conjunctive, and those in clause bodies have to be monotonic and nitary.
Our language does not belong to the class of languages that satisfy the above conditions even in the restricted case when clauses do not contain embedded implications nor modalities in front of clauses. In fact, the modal operators used in clause bodies are not nitary. Nevertheless, a xpoint semantics could be given to the language. In 7] this is done for a class of modal languages (without embedded implications) in which arbitrary sequences of universal modalities may occur in front of clauses, goals and clause heads. There the correspondence between the xpoint and declarative semantics is proved through a canonical model construction. That technique could be extended to deal with embedded implications by suitably de ning an immediate consequence operator as a function of the modal context.
In this work we have tackled a rather speci c modal language providing a collection of modalities of type K and a single S4 modality, which we believe to be well suited for some applications. However, as described in Section 4, a similar extension of logic programming can be de ned for other kinds of modal logics. For instance, we could take the modalities a i ] as being ruled by the axioms of T, or K4, or S4, rather than K, by suitably changing the notion of matching in the proof procedure, while retaining the general structure of the procedure. A study of goal directed proof methods for the implicational fragment of many modal logics (K, K4, S4 and S5) and substructural logics has been done in 50], where a proof procedure which makes use of a restart rule is provided.
Instead of developing speci c theorem proving techniques and tools for modal logics, many authors have proposed the alternative approach of translating modal logics into classical rst order logic 20], so that standard theorem provers can be used without the need to build new ones. The translation methods are based on the idea of making explicit reference to the worlds, by adding to all predicates and functions an argument representing the world where the predicate holds, so that the modal operators can be transformed into quanti ers of classical logic. In particular, in the functional approach 3, 48], accessibility is represented by means of functions, and the most common properties, such as transitivity or re exivity, can be taken into account by an equational uni cation algorithm. An advantage of the functional method is that it keeps the structure of the original formula.
In the case of modal logic programming, this approach has been used in 18, 47 ] to obtain a standard Prolog program starting form Horn clauses extended with modal operators. In particular Nonnengart 47] has proposed a mixed approach based on a relational and functional translation. In our case however, since the modal language allows embedded implication, it is not possible to apply directly the translation approach to obtain standard Horn clauses. In 8] we have developed a translation method which works for the language presented here, consisting of two steps. In the rst step all embedded implications are eliminated so as to obtain a program consisting only of modal Horn clauses. This step requires the introduction of a new modal operator for each embedded implication, so that the extracted clauses can be used only in the right environment. The second step is based on an approach similar to the functional translation: modalities are eliminated by adding to each predicate an argument which represents the modal context. This translation method could also be used to deal with embedded implications within the MOLOG framework if the underlying modal logic is the same as ours. It is worth noting that a program of our language after the rst step of this translation is also a program in the TIM framework 4], provided that the appropriate set of inference rules are supplied. 
A Soundness
We will prove soundness of the operational semantics with respect to the sequent calculus. We need to introduce a de nition and some lemmas. Proof By an easy induction on the length n ? k of the sequence L k+1 : : :L n . Theorem 30 (Soundness of the operational semantics) Given a program P and a goal G of L, if G is operationally derivable from P, then the sequent P ! G is provable. Proof If G is operationally derivable from P, then, by de nition, (L 0 ; P)`G can be derived by applying the rules of the operational semantics. That is, there is a sequence (W 0 ; G 0 ); : : :; (W m ; G m ) such that W 0 = (L 0 ; P), G 0 = G, G m = T, and, for all j = 1; : : :; m, (W j ; G j ) can be obtained from later pairs in the sequence by applying the proof rules 1)-6) of De nition 9.
To prove the thesis, we prove that, for each s = 0; : : :; m,
is provable sequent. The proof is by induction on s. Cases G m?s = L n+1 G 0 and G m?s = 9xG 0 : They can be dealt with similarly to the previous ones. Therefore (3) holds for all s 2 f0; : : :; mg. As a special case, for s = m, we have that ? W0 ! G 0 and, by Lemma 28, G 0 2 ? W0 , i.e., D 0 ! G 0 is a provable sequent. Since D 0 = P and G 0 = G, this amounts to say that P ! G is a provable sequent.
B Completeness
In this appendix we prove the lemmas needed to show the completeness of the operational semantics with respect to the sequent calculus.
Lemma 31 (L 0 rule) Let be a proof of a sequent P ! G where P is a program and G a goal of L, then there is a proof 0 of P ! G which uses the following rule
Proof We prove the lemma that for all sequent ! in the following properties hold: 1. there exists a proof of ! which uses the rule L 0 instead of L ; 2. if has the form C; 0 (i.e. the sequent has the form ! c; 0 ) then there is a proof for ! C or for ! 0 which makes use of L 0 instead of L . In particular, since P ! G is a sequent which belongs to the thesis holds. We prove the properties above by induction on height of the proof of ! . If the height h of is 1 then is an axiom. Proof The proof of this lemma is straightforward induction on the height of proofs. Lemma 33 Let a proof of the sequent P ! G where P is a program and G a goal of L, then there is a proof 0 of the same sequent which does not make use of the constants (parameters) added to language L 2 k to obtainL 2 k . Proof First we prove the lemma that for all sequent ! C in there exists a sequent 0 ! C 0 which has a proof without parameters. 0 ! C 0 has been obtained from ! C by replacing all occurrences of parameters by elements of U P (the Herbrand universe of the program P).
By induction on height of the proof of ! C. If the height h of is 1 then is an axiom.
There are two cases: Case ! T: If the axiom contains parameters then we substitute any element of U P for each of them, and we obtain an axiom again.
Case ; A ! A: It is similar to the case above. In particular, if there is a parameter in A, and after the substitution we have A 0 , then 0 ; A 0 ! A 0 is an axiom again.
The height of is h + 1. By inductive hypothesis the thesis holds for proof with height less or equal to h. We consider the following cases, one for each inference gure in which can terminate.
Cases L8 and R9: Assume that the root inference gure in is L8. Hence, is of the form 1 ; x=c]A ! C ; 8xA ! C L8 By inductive hypothesis there is a sequent 0 ; x=c 0 ]A 0 ! C 0 and a proof 0 1 for it without parameters. Now, by applying L8 rule, we obtain a proof 0 of 0 ; 8xA 0 ! C 0 without parameters. The case when the last inference gure in is R9 is similar.
Cases R^, L^, L 0 , R ai] , R 2 , R2, L2: Obvious, by inductive hypothesis. Now we go back to the main lemma. Since P ! G is a sequent of we have just proved that there is a proof 0 of P 0 ! G 0 without parameters. Then, we can observe that P = P 0 and G = G 0 because P and G do not contain parameters.
The following lemma shows the re exive and transitive properties of modal operator 2 in the operational semantics. The length of the derivation is h + 1. Assume that Lemma 34 holds for derivations with length less or equal than h. We consider the following cases on the structure of G. The height of is h + 1. By inductive hypothesis the thesis holds for proofs with height less or equal to h. We consider the following cases, one for each inference gure in which can terminate.
Cases R^and L^: Assume that the root inference gure in is R^. Hence, is of the form Assume that the properties (1) and (2) hold for the sequent ; A B ! C. We prove that they hold for ! A.
